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Article 5

Imaging Madness: Inter-ships Mieke
Bal Inter-mediality is just another form
of “inter-ship” that, like the international
life I lead, the inter-disciplinary work I
do, in particular inter-arts analysis, the
inter-generational trauma I will come to
talk about, the inter-temporal mutuality
I have called “pre-posterous history”: all
these, like the inherent inter-mediality of
audio-visual media, indicate relationships,
mutuality, exchange and dialogue, more
than plurality, multitude, and whatever is
indicated through the preposition “trans-.” df
I insist on the specific relationality of “inter-”
and its distinctive operations between the
members it connects. I am interested in
how images help articulate and embody
thought. I contend that images can perform
an equivalent of speech acts; that they can
respond (“speak back”) to the look cast onto
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1. For the idea of the
performativity of
images, modelled
on speech act theory,
see J. L. Austin, How
to Do Things with
Words, Second Edition,
(Oxford: Oxford
University Press,
1971);1962. Mieke Bal,
Travelling Concepts
in the Humanities: A
Rough Guide, (Toronto:
Toronto University
Press, 2002). For the
concept of ‘“theoretical
object,’” see Hubert
Damisch in Bois,
Yve-Alain, et al. ‘A
Conversation with
Hubert Damisch,’
October 85, (Summer),
1998: 3-17.

2. Jacques Derrida,
Limited Inc, trans.
Samuel Weber and
Jeffrey Mehlman
(Evanston, Il:
Northwestern
University Press, 1988);
Judith Butler, Gender
Trouble, (Oxford:
Routledge, 2006);
Bodies That Matter,
(Oxford: Routledge,
2011). For an excellent
overview of this
travel of the concept
of performativity,
see Jonathan Culler,
‘Philosophy and
Literature: The Fortunes
of the Performative,’
Poetics Today, vol.
21, no. 3, (Fall) 2000:
503-519. See also the
chapter “Performance
and Performativity”

them, and that they can entice viewers to theorize. They are performative.
They do something; they act. I call such “speaking images,” which speak
back, resist (parts of) my interpretation of them, and make me think,
“theoretical objects.”1
I took this view one step further when, in an inter-ship for which I have
not yet a name, I began to supplement my research into contemporary
(migratory) culture with filmmaking. I considered (documentary)
filmmaking as a form of research. The term “auto-theory” indicates a form
of thinking that integrates my own practice of image-making as a form
of thinking, and reflecting on what I have made as a continuation of the
making. Auto-theory is not self-indulgent navel gazing because of the
concept of images as performative that underlies it, and through which
the relationship between the films and the intellectual reflection remains
dialogic. The present essay is an example of auto-theory in this sense.
It is widely known that the concept of performativity has been taken
up in philosophy and cultural studies, particularly in feminist and queer
studies, under the influence primarily of Judith Butler. Following Derrida’s
commentary on Austin’s concept, Butler emphasized that it is not the
exceptional speech act—“I declare war,” “I declare you husband and wife”—
but the routine, reiterated speech acts that determine who one is, including
sexually. The habits of reiteration are open to (slow) change, however.
Precisely by inhabiting a routine one can change it from within.2
Images, the ensemble of images we call visual culture, participate in
those routines and their changes. This performativity is significant more
generally for images that, according to our ontological distinctions, do
not (materially) exist, as is the case, at least in part, with the inter-ship
I wish to discuss here, a propos of the film Mère folle. A second topic
in this presentation will be the way in which space—again, taken to be
performative—can be considered a medium. This has been experimented
with in the video installation The Space In-Between, derived from the
material of the film and exhibited in video exhibitions, including in DIT’s
Broadcast Gallery (November 2011).
There was a series of images that came out of an activity of reading. This
“coming out of reading” happened twice over. First, an author wrote a book
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in which she described images that came out of her own readings. Second, I
read that book, and images—the same ones? different ones?—came out of
my reading of her readings. Except for the cover image, a detail from Pieter
Breughel the Elder’s painting Dulle Griet (Mad Meg, 1562), there were
no images, in the material sense, included in the book. Yet, these written
images were so strong that after seeing them with my mind’s eye I had to
make them, as “after-images” that were interpretants of the images evoked
but not presented—even though technically, the book was a theoretical
treatise.3
I use the term interpretant in the sense in which American philosopher
Charles Sanders Peirce theorized the sign, in order to make the point that
images can be signs even if they are not materially extant. Peirce starts his
definition of the sign with a perceptible object. The question posed by this
object—“What does it mean?”—cannot be answered by revealing something
inherent in the object. Instead, the cultural group in which the object
circulates works the meaning out in a practice that yields a second, further
developed object. That second object, or sign, is the interpretant, a new
sign developed on the basis of, and evoked by, the attempt to understand
the first sign.4 Objects, hence also images, are active participants in the
performance of analysis in that they enable reflection and speculation. They
can contradict projections and wrong-headed interpretations (if the analyst
lets them), and thus constitute a theoretical object with philosophical
relevance, whether materially embodied or not. Hence, reflecting “from
within,” as maker, on how these processes work is an activity steeped in a
larger cultural context, not a self-indulgent intellectual autism.
There are two further reasons why “auto-theory” is not individualistic
self-reflection, and the images involved, by definition themselves subject
to “inter-.” First, filmmaking is never something one does alone. For Mère
folle, we had, for example, actors, both volunteers and professionals, we had
help with script, camera, sound, translation, and there were people who
made a superb website for the project.5 But most importantly, I am making
this film with British artist Michelle Williams Gamaker. Michelle and I have
been collaborating since 2002, the beginning of my practice in filmmaking,
when Michelle was already a practicing (video) artist. Hence, when I use the
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in my book Travelling
concepts in the
humanities: a Rough
guide, (Toronto:
University of Toronto
Press, 2002)

3. Françoise Davoine,
1998. The film and
installations are coauthored. Mieke Bal
& Michelle Williams
Gamaker, 2011, A Long
History of Madness.
HD digital video,
colour, sound, 120
minutes. Multilingual,
subtitles English,
French, Spanish, Dutch,
Finnish, Russian.
Distributed by Films
d’Atalante, Paris.

4. See, for example,
Peirce, ‘Logic as
Semiotic: The Theory of
Signs,’ Philosophical
Writings of Peirce,
edited and with an
introduction by J.
Buchler, (New York:
Dover Publications,
1955).

5. www.
crazymothermovie.
com, dir. Olli Heinola,
Juho Heinola

6. Marianna Torgovnick,
‘The Politics of the
We,’ South Atlantic
Quarterly 91, (Winter)
1992. Torgovnick
writes of the slide into
we as “a covert, and
sometimes coercive,
universal”... the full
deceptiveness of the
false cultural ‘we’.”
(265) As members of
the collective Cinema
Suitcase, Michelle
Williams Gamaker and
I collaborated on the
films Mille et un jours
(2004), Colony (2007),
and Becoming Vera
(2008). We have both
made other films with
other members of the
collective, as well as
individually (www.
cinemasuitcase.com).
7. I am aware that the
more common term is
“adaptation.” However,
I choose to consider
the film a translation,
because of the specific
issue the activity of
translation entails,
according to the
Benjaminian stream
of thought I engage
here. Among many
studies of adaptation,
the following collection
deserves attention.
See Robert Stam and
Allessandra Raengo,
(eds.) 2005 Literature
and Film: the Guide to
the Theory and Practice
of Film Adaptation,
(Adapation. New York:
Blackwell, 2005).

pronoun “I” it should be heard as “we” in most cases. I cannot use “we” as
this pronoun has been marred by the universalist “we” that strives to create
a “we-feeling” that is in turn liable to constitute an exclusive audience and
its manipulated benevolence. That is why I avoid it here. What I am going
to say about the film is my own responsibility—hence the persistence of
“I”—while the film as such is a collective work, and specifically the work of
Michelle and myself in an equal partnership.6
Second, there is another intense partnership involved, which bears on
the status and the nature of the images. The film is a “translation” of a book
by French psychoanalyst Françoise Davoine, an act that has turned out best
served in close collaboration with the author. The images she “saw,” or had
in mind, when she wrote her book are inevitably very different from the
ones that ended up in the film. There are several layers of interpretation and
imagination between the one and the other. This is compounded by the fact
that the author plays herself; but only after the images had circulated, and
Michelle and I have transformed them, did they come back to the author,
from the outside so to speak, who, playing her role, transformed them again.
This is why the film images can only be what I call “after-images,” with
several temporal and visual layers separating the “original” from the images
in the film.7

of the Guggenheim Bilbao museum (2010).8 Each new phase of that
becoming is informed by a later work that retrospectively glosses an earlier
work. Each new work puts a spin on the ensemble of what came before it.
In that becoming as an oeuvre or a work consisting of multiple images, my
theoretical object is the body of images named Mère folle, inflected by what
“my work”—as a reader, co-filmmaker, and critic of the resulting images—
adds to and changes in that corpus. And, according to the retrospective
logic I have elsewhere called “preposterous,” the beginning or starting
point is the set of filmic images, followed by the images “we saw,” only
then followed by those in the author’s book and ending with those images
the author “saw,” and that are fundamentally inaccessible to me. It is this
retrospective impact that is the point of studying an image as a source of
further and more profound insight than the usual documentation can offer.9

My attempt to develop “auto-theory” as a worthy methodological tool is
also in line with a specific conception of the fundamental inter-temporality
of images. Even a material painting existed once only in the artist’s mind,
and then came off on canvas much different. That material painting then
changes again with each act of viewing projected upon it, with time, place,
and social circumstance of its subsequent “life” as a work of art. An image,
in this sense, will always be in the process of “becoming.” By that Deleuzian
term I mean something quite specific. Not only each artwork, but a priori
the entire oeuvre of an artist is and remains in the process of becoming. The
becoming of an oeuvre implies a retrospective temporal logic according to
which each new work recasts the terms in which the previous works could
be understood. For example, a next phase of becoming, at the same time
as a preposterous dialogue between an earlier moment and our film, is the
video installation Anacronismos/Anachronisms we made for a commission

Imaging Madness
This leads to the question: can one “image” madness? Davoine’s book,
written in the first person, hovers between fiction and theory and integrates
the best of both. We considered it a “theoretical fiction,” the term Freud uses
frequently, for example, to explain the genre of Totem and Taboo, his story
of the primitive band of sons in revolt, killing and eating the tyrannical
father.10 Sometimes, Freud’s story intimates, it takes fiction or other forms of
imaginative thought to understand that for which reason is too simple. This
underwrites my deployment of video art to further analyse what cannot be
studied easily in documentation. Davoine’s book, too, has theoretical points
to make and uses speculation and fiction to develop, articulate, and make
them, and subsequently so has (and does) our film. But, unlike Freud’s
primary tool of plot, Davoine’s points are primarily made through images,
not through discussion. The plot itself, not absent, serves, rather, to frame
the images.11
Like Davoine’s auto-fictional book—but not in the same
autobiographical form—the film stages the inter-ship or intertwinement of
two confrontations. One occurs between a psychoanalyst and her severely
traumatized (“mad”) patients. The other confronts this contemporary world
with medieval Fools, agents of a late-medieval political theatre. Most of the
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8. On “becoming,”
see Gilles Deleuze
and Félix Guattari, A
Thousand Plateaus.
tr. Brian Massumi,
(Minneapolis:
University of
Minnesota Press,.
1987), where they use
that term throughout.
For an argument about
the transformative
nature of images
that supports an
anti-intentionalist
position, see Bal,
Travelling Concepts
in the Humanities
(2002, 253-85). On the
retrospective logic as a
historical perspective,
see M. Bal, ed. The
Practice of Cultural
Analysis: Exposing
Interdisciplinary
Interpretation,
(Stanford: Stanford
University Press,my
1999).
9. An additional
temporal layer
occurred when the
actors, inspired by the
group performance,
started to improvise
and make their own
images, beyond
enacting the roles
assigned to them.
Although author and
filmmakers remain
relatively independent
from each other, it is
relevant to realize that
the preposterous logic
I have developed as
a historical approach
squares perfectly with
Davoine’s conception
of history, particularly
(but not exclusively)
as it plays itself out in
madness. See the clip
“Françoise on Time”
on the video section
of the film’s website,
as well as many
remarks in her books:
La mère folle (Paris:
Arcanes Recherche
Psychanalytique
(1992, 1998), La folie
Wittgenstein, (Paris:
Du Croquant, 2012),
among others;, 2008),
and the scenography of

her encounters with
people from the past
registered there.
10. Sigmund Freud,
Totem and Taboo,
trans. A. A. Bril, (New
York: Moffat Yard and
Company, 1918)
11. The idea that
images are received,
rather than created
by the author, was
suggested to me by
Kaja Silverman’s recent
book Flesh of my Flesh,
(Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2009),
in which she discusses
this attitude of artists
apropos of Rilke
(2009). Davoine’s book
is an extraordinary
integration of theory
and images, “facts”
and fiction. Among
other advantages, such
as more subtlety and
strong identification,
this integration
allowed the author to
do justice to the lived
experiences in the
case histories of her
patients without being
the dominating one
who writes them.

12. This is quite a
heavy task, especially
if we also consider
Benjamin’s paradoxical
view of translation.
“While content and
language form a
certain unity in the
original, like a fruit and

time, these two worlds mingle. The theoretical and political importance of
the film lies in a positive representation of mad (or psychotic) people and
a constructive interaction between mad and sane people through which
both learn things from the other that help them to live their lives. Within
the film, medieval Fools strike precisely that balance. This motivates their
participation. Hence, in this inter-temporally ambiguous representation of
“madness”—rather than in relation to the book as such—our first allegiance
was positioned.
Only a carefully thought-through image of the Fools and their
contemporary counterparts, the Mad, can do justice to this allegiance. To
achieve this, an ontological uncertainty with bearing on epistemology was
our primary guideline. The Fools raise an ontological question that also
bears on the status of the images and what they convey in their various
inter-ships. The Fools are not mad but play the fool. So how do we know
what “being mad” is, and whether that is different from playing? Can
you play what you are, and be, or become, what you play? This is the
theoretical question that undermines the authority of the archaeological
thrust of psychoanalysis. It lies at the heart of Davoine’s social approach
to psychoanalysis, her attempt to make the theory and practice less
individualistic and do justice to psychoanalysis as a profoundly social
science. And it is what makes the psychoanalytic space a medium, as we
attempt to show with the installation.
For us, as filmmakers, this question was doubled by another one,
concerning intermediality: how can we make that unknowability or
undecidability itself visible, convincing, and productive? The book
integrates theory, fiction, and documentary. Here lies the debt the film and
its images have towards the book. As a “faithful” intermedial translation, the
film owes it to the book to make that integration of traditionally separate
domains visible, and to the book as theoretical object in the sense described
above, to draw conclusions, visual and otherwise, from that integration.12

as a frame for these images, a setting for the madness, and a focus for the
staging of the “mad.” The story, in book and film, runs as follows. After a
taste of the practice of psychoanalysis, the analyst’s opening words tell us
that “tomorrow is All Saints’ Day.” That makes “today” the Day of the Dead.
As it happens, Françoise has just learned of the death by overdose of one of
her psychotic patients. Discouraged, she blames herself and psychoanalysis
for this tragic failure. She enters a deep crisis. She is tempted to abandon
her job at the psychiatric hospital. While pondering this decision in the
courtyard of the hospital, she takes a book on the Middle Ages out of her
bag. It is a book that her dead patient had requested she bring to him. As
she rummages through her bag and finds the book, the enigmatic figure of
Mère Folle appears—as if out of the book, as its interpretant. A number of
medieval Fools accost Françoise, challenging psychoanalysis as fraudulent.
Their primary grievance is the privileging of word over gesture, the
individual over the group, and the past over the present. Their leader, Mère
Folle, is depressed because the Fools do not obey her anymore. She sits
down in silence. With a wink to iconography, she takes the pose of Dürer’s
famous engraving Melencolia I (1514). In the film, the apparition of the
Fools out of the book is embedded in the entire scene in the courtyard.
In turn, this scene comes out of the contemplation, in the hospital in
Finland, of Brueghel the Elder’s painting by the psychoanalyst treating
Sissi, Françoise’s first patient who, like Freud’s Dora, had dismissed her as
incompetent. Thus, the film confounds any attempt to construct temporality
as linear.13

Storying Madness
Film is an uncompromisingly temporal medium. This translation was
possible because there is also a story: not as a fiction for its own sake but

A discussion ensues in which a dead-pan Françoise remains situated
in the present without being astonished by the confrontation with another
historical time, and responds as if in discussion with colleagues. It is this
ability to remain her professional self while engaging with other times and
their discourses that is her primary strength, both as an actress and as an
analyst. It is her own unique inter-ship. That discrepancy in tone was our
interpretation of the rather even tone of the argumentative prose in the
book, in spite of the exuberance of the descriptive parts. We translated this
tone into the main character’s calm acting, although the text does not reflect
on it per se.14 But we had to visualize a point that the book makes constantly
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its skin, the language
of the translation
envelops its content
like a royal robe
with ample folds,”
Walter Benjamin
writes in “The Task
of the Translator”
(Illuminations, ed.
Hannah Arendt.
[London: Pimlico,
1999], 761968, 75). See
also the discussion in
Jacques Derrida1983
(93-161). For an
extensive discussion
of Benjamin’s text, see
Chapter Two of Bal,
Travelling Concepts in
the Humanities.

13. Freud’s Dora case
has been extensively
interpreted. See, for
example, Charles
Bernheimer and Claire
Kahane, In Dora’s
Case: Freud-HysteriaFeminism, (London:
Virago, 1985). There
are serious issues
involving a lack of
empathy on the part
of the analyst. In
Françoise’s case, Sissi
blames her for refusing
identification. Later, the
analyst is able to see
the justification of that
blame.
14. The author, the

main character-narrator,
and the actress are
the same person. For
clarity’s sake I will
use the first name
“Françoise” when
speaking about the
character, actress, and
narrator, and use her
last name “Davoine”
when talking about the
author of the book.

15. Since we had a
micro-budget for the
film, we mostly had to
work with volunteer
actors. The Musical
Nurse (Leticia Bal) is a
professional musician
(www.rumbadama.nl)
but amateur actress,
while the Head
Nurse is a prominent
professional actress
(Olga Zuiderhoek) who
generously donated
her time for the project.

yet only implicitly, which is the ontological uncertainty, mentioned before,
of madness between enactment, being, and being-perceived. From this
uncertainty the film derives its philosophical experiment. Since playing the
fool is the Fools’ profession, this took a specifically theatrical form, in an
inter-arts probing of the relationships between theatre and cinema. The film
shows how the Fools can no longer be separated from the Mad. These begin
to mingle with them, even to chant comments drawn from medieval poems
under the direction of the Musical Nurse who tries to calm them with their
own means, all of this adding to the panic of the Head Nurse.15
But a professional crisis is harder to actually live than Françoise had
thought. The fools end up irritating her out of her determination to resign
from her job, and reluctantly she returns to work. There she is caught by
her affection for and identification with the patients and the occasional
success of a treatment. As she talks with patients, the distinction between
the Fools and the Mad fades away slowly. This ontological uncertainty of
madness is made visible by several means, one of which is the quite simple
ploy of actors playing multiple roles. The most striking instance of this is
the performance by French actor Thomas Germaine. In the courtyard he
shows up among the Fools under the name of Antonin (later, his last name
turns out to be Artaud), a self-proclaimed although anachronistic friend
of sixteenth-century writer Étienne de la Boétie. As the latter cannot speak,
Antonin speaks for him. In the hospital scene, Germaine is a patient, also
called Antonin. And in the trial, he acts out Artaud’s combination of genius
and madness.
At this point one already wonders if these figures are one, two, or
three persons. Moreover, at the beginning and towards the end of the
film Germaine shows up at Françoise’s office as a homeless man seeking
treatment, and the short treatment they undertake together is successful.
His name is Herlat, another name for Harlequin, the King of Death that
Mère Folle conjures up during the trial, at which point, however, not
Harlequin but Artaud appears. All these characters may or may not be the
same “person.”
The medium of space, performative as it is, shapes each appearance
differently. This questions the ontology of personhood embedded in the
60 In/Print June 2013

questioning of madness and brings to this question another philosophical
relevance. What is at stake in this playful enactment is the notion of the
individual subject itself. And, since the book proposes a theory of a social
psychoanalysis, where the small histories of the patients converge with the
tragedies of History, this questioning through casting is loyal to the book’s
theoretical thrust.16
Meanwhile, Françoise is abducted by two Mafiosi and so begins a
strange voyage. She is taken to the Middle Ages—or rather, the Middles
Ages surface in the present, in a small, somewhat shabby Parisian theatre.
There, Françoise is brought before a court where she is blamed for her lack
of insight, and psychoanalysis’ repression of gesture in favour of words. The
episodes of that court case confront her, and us, with the sane reasoning
behind the Fool’s mask. The alleged fools come from the tradition of
“sotties,” a political theatre from the late Middle Ages, a kind of carnival
of Fools. These are the Fools who merged with the patients at the hospital.
Their arrival thus becomes a political moment.17
As opposed to the patients, the fools have impunity. Françoise, consistent
in her in-betweenness, cannot help herself listening and discussing these
issues seriously. During the trial, in the form of imaginary or dreamt
dialogues, the narrator’s own literary and philosophical sources also mix in
with great thinkers such as Antonin Artaud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, TS Eliot.
There is even a glimpse of Friedrich Nietzsche.18
For the narrator, this dialogic traversal of time is also a return to her
own past. Her boundaries—in time, space, and identity—melt down.
The relevance of this undermining of individuality becomes clear when
she becomes capable of identifying not only with her patients, in whose
adventures she begins to participate, but also with her former self. To
underline the difficulty of this connection the younger Françoise speaks
Spanish, a “mother tongue” different to her French.
Two patients from the past stroll through Françoise’s world when she
least expects it. These are a woman named Sissi—doctor Davoine’s first
failure of twenty years ago—and the timeless, elfish Ariste who dies at the
beginning only to resurface regularly throughout the film as an “inspector”
(or as Françoise’s bruised super-ego), as a source of gossip, and as a
61 Mieke Bal Imaging Madness: Inter-ships

16. The antiindividualism that
permeates the book,
and that the film
represents by many
different means, is its
primary philosophical
point, as well as its
proposal for clinical
psychoanalysis. For
a philosophical
questioning of the
individual subject,
see Cadava et al. eds.
Who Comes After the
Subject? (London:
Routledge, 1991)

17. The shabby
character of the theatre
fits the street character
of the Fools’ theatrical
practice. It goes
against the grain of the
cultural dominance
Pierre Bourdieu has
termed “distinction”
(Distinction: A
Social Critique of
the Judgement of
Taste, translated by
R Nice, [Routledge &
Kegan Paul, London,
1985]).1984). The
scene of the Trial
conforms subtly to
the traditional genre
of the “sotie.” See
Jean-Claude Aubailly,
Le Monologue, le
dialogue et la sottie,
(Paris: H. Champion,
1976) and Jelle
Koopmans, Le théâtre
des exclus au Moyen
Âge, (Paris, Imago,
1997).
18. An excellent
social-cultural study
of the sotties in the
Netherlands, and its
continuity with carnival,
is Herman Pleij 2007
De eeuw van

de zotheid. Over de nar
als maatschappelijk
houvast in de
vroegmoderne tijd,
(Amsterdam: Bert
bakker, 2007). The
book, and, to a lesser
extent, the film contain
many quotations from
Artaud’s (1958 [1938])
The Theater and Its
Double, (New York:
Grove Press, 1958).
19. Jacques Derrida,
The Gift of Death, trans.
D. Wills, (Chicago:
University of Chicago
Press, 1996). On
the importance and
risks of empathy and
identification see
Dominick LaCapra,
especially 2001,
Writing History, Writing
Trauma, (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2001)
and Jill Bennett, 2005
Empathic Vision:
Art, Politics, Trauma,
(Stanford; Stanford
University Press, 2005).
20. The notion of
“extreme identification”
was Michelle’s and
my interpretation of
Davoine’s method. The
term “catastrophic
regions” is Davoine’s.

memory. These two phantom patients constantly confront Françoise with
the difficulty of her work and the danger, yet likelihood, of failure. Ariste
becomes Françoise’s spectre in the combined philosophical and sociologicalpolitical sense put forward by Derrida, his death a sacrifice to earn insight
into the importance of identification, a kind of gift.19
From these combined travels Françoise gains the ability to practice
immersion into the deliria of her patients, in order to become a fraternal
equal to them. Only through such an “extreme identification” will she be
able to carve for them an auxiliary space wherein the “catastrophic regions”
that generated their madness can be confronted. Throughout the story, the
narrator has been doing precisely that, becoming an equal to the “fools” and
the “mad.”20
It is on this hopeful note that, during the turmoil of the Carnival of
Basel, the immersion into the medieval universe of folly, the story ends.
Between the trial and the Carnival, Françoise’s day is not over. She continues
to treat Herlat, then pays an overdue visit to the grave of her former teacher,
the sister of her father’s Resistance friend, inveterate Spanish freedom fighter
Don Luis, as well as to that of the latter’s “mad aunt,” who also haunts her
childhood memories.
Theoretical considerations, initially only occurring in the mind of
the narrator, will be taken over by fools, colleagues, patients. Thus, the
film produces theory: a theory of madness as bound up with historical
catastrophe; of psychoanalysis as an emphatically social science and
practice; of the individual subject as fatally but also, helpfully porous,
inseparable from other subjects; of images and their capacity of speech; of
speech as imaged and imaginative.

question of subjectivity as crucially social, and the inter-ship between
cinema and theory.
The first, major intervention concerned the individualism and the
linguistic bias that the Fools impute to Françoise. But her entire project
is a battle against the individualism that keeps the Mad impermeable to
psychoanalysis, and cuts them off from society. Instead, her life’s work
consists of attempts to preserve psychoanalysis as a social science. In the
book this discussion, obviously, can only remain verbal, although it is,
narratologically speaking, astonishingly “jumpy,” interrupted by small
occurrences and verbal punning, misunderstandings and anachronistic
“errors,” and never leading to a compromise or resolution. Here, a dilemma
arises that determines how the film can contribute to insight into sociality:
do we do justice to the discussion, to the author’s project, or to the story, in
our intermedial work?21

Socializing Madness
With these complexities in mind, you will not be surprised that for Michelle
and me it was as difficult as it was important to remain loyal, not so much
to the book as to our own desire to make a film based on it. The theoretical
thrust compelled certain visual decisions that, at first sight, have little
to do with theory. Here, I want to discuss some of these decisions as a
contribution to the question of how images help intellectual work, the

In Davoine’s book, the story concerns Françoise’s crisis and the voyage
of discovery that leads to her insight. It is a kind of Bildungsroman or travel
story, what the Spanish created in the tradition of the picaresque novel. If
this form were respected in detail, the film would become too centred
on a single character. In particular, this form would not do justice to the
fact that in Françoise’s eyes the Fools have a point. We deployed several
levels of dispersal in order to avoid an individualistic, autobiographical
interpretation of a story that, in fact, harbours important theoretical insights
that go against individualism. Thus we sought to revise the very notion of
autobiography; in particular, the auto of it. These dispersals make the story
more general while preserving the singularity of the characters involved.
This was our first, primary act of loyalty-by-betrayal.22
Another dispersal concerns language. The film is multilingual. Actors
from different countries speak their own languages. The multilingual
speeches became images of a multi-cultural Europe, as well as of a certain
kind of social madness present in the contemporary world. At the same
time, they became almost utopian images of the possibility to communicate
against all odds. The psychoanalyst’s dilemma, for example, is shared
by other psychoanalysts. Here, the intermediality itself is theoretically
relevant: images build bridges because they help to communicate across the
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21. See Peter Verstraten,
Film Narratology, trans.
S. van der Lecq, for
a film narratology
that is consistent
with my own
narratological concepts
in Bal, Narratology:
Introduction to the
Theory of Narrative,
(Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2009).

22. The second analyst
is played by Marjo
Vuorela, also a reallife psychoanalyst.
Françoise Davoine
commented on this
point: “I feel not
betrayed but expanded”
(augmentée, personal
communication,
January 3, 2010). Many
of our interventions
started out as need,
were compelled by
circumstance and
received theoretical
support retrospectively,

or half-way through
the making of the
film. But I will not go
into the adventures of
a micro-budget film
production here.

23. There is an obvious
connection between
this multilingualism
and my video
installation “Nothing
is Missing,” (see http://
www.miekebal.org/
artworks/installations/
nothing-is-missing/)

24. Thanks to Mia
Hannula of the
University of Turku,
whose constant
support and help has
been indispensable
to us. The beautiful
documentary “Women
of Seili” by Mikaela
Weurlander (2008),
which we saw only
later, gives background
information about the
hospital that converges
astonishingly with

boundaries that separate the sane from the mad, the contemporary from
earlier times, and different cultural and linguistic communities from each
other. The psychoanalyst establishes a connection, however briefly, between
the function of images and the accumulative effect of the oral transmission
of poetry. The tension in this multilingualism between a utopian vision
and a certain kind of madness became a rich source of inter-play with the
ambivalence of the book toward classical psychoanalysis, the uncertainty of
madness, and contemporary European reality.23
Former patients of doctor Davoine are now either independent or live in
a “half-way house” where they are getting ready to re-integrate into society,
elsewhere, under the guidance of other psychoanalysts. As an example of a
visual-linguistic pun that makes a theoretical point tangible, this house is
in “the North,” because retrouver le nord is the French phrase for coming
to your senses. Just as the patients there struggle to come to their senses, so
does psychiatry.
As I mentioned in the interview, to film this half-way house we ended up
on the historically layered Seili Island, a small island off the coast of Turku,
Finland. The sense of the place gives a peek into the layering of history in
the present. On this island, a former leprosy hospital had been converted
into a hospital for the insane, only to close in 1962, an embodiment of
Foucault’s History of Madness. After the disappearance of leprosy in that
part of the world, the old hospital cared for the mad (mostly of the lower
classes and more often women than men), who were never to return home
to the mainland. A chilling requirement for admission, we learned, was
that patients bring their own coffin. This is one example of how setting
contributes to a further—in this case, historical—clarification of the bond
between madness and society.24
Indeed, an aspect that matters enormously for filmmaking is setting.
It is where the scenography can be inscribed. Apart from their obvious
movement, film images are set in spaces that have continuous presence
and, hence, a function in a film as much as in society. We needed to evoke
what Mexican psychoanalyst Alberto Montoya Hernández has called
“landscapes of madness.” This beautifully ambiguous concept refers both to
the imaginary places in which madness elects to situate itself, and to images
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of landscapes that appear mad or are hospitable to the Mad. Through this
concept, madness can be placed firmly in the world.25
We wished the landscape of madness to be both full of the real history
of madness and slightly anachronistic, in order to connect it to the
contemporary social world. Two parts of the film are set in psychiatric
hospitals: the treatment of Sissi by another analyst and the work Françoise
does once she returns to her job. The location for the first part is an obsolete
psychiatric institution in Nokia, Finland, called Pitkäniemi Hospital. It is
reminiscent of the hospital at Seili. The location for the other part is in
Amsterdam, the Netherlands: an art deco building housing an art school,
with large echoing spaces that respond to the idea of collective treatment in
more ways than one. The images show that this cannot be what is known
as group therapy, because the patients are too deeply immersed in their
madness to connect to each other. This isolation, in turn, comes across
through the echoing sound characteristic of the large halls, which makes for
difficult understanding. The echo surrounds each patient with an isolating
auditory halo.
The patients’ only sociality is with Françoise, a situation that burdens
the latter with the responsibility to begin restoring sociality with and for
them. Thus, a drawback of that particular location—its terrible acoustics—
ends up contributing to making concrete, to auditively “image,” the central
problem in madness according to Davoine’s book: the broken social bonds
that leave the patients in what she calls “catastrophic regions,” a term that
resonates with Montoya Hernández’s “landscapes of madness.” For Davoine,
these regions—mental and geographical as well as historical—harbour the
violence that generates madness, sometimes generations later.26
These sites are “turned mad” by the discrepancies between the normal
goings-on and the interference wrought by the Fools. Seili Island and its
hospital convey the sense of isolation that is a silent stream in the film. In
the South of Spain, we set the visit Françoise pays to Don Luis, the old
family friend and Resistance fighter, in order to broaden the scope of the
historical violence invoked. Here, a visit to the cemetery dates the film to
that long 31st of October, the Day of the Dead, as well as placing it against
that other paisaje de la locura that was the Spanish Civil War. These are
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our film. The primary
source on this
“invention” of madness
as a hospitable disease
after leprosy remains
Michel Foucault. The
English edition of
his Madness and
Civilization is an
abridged version
of Folie et déraison:
Histoire de la folie
à l’âge classique,
originally published
in 1961. A full English
translation titled
History of Madness
was published by
Routledge in 2006
25. On the sociology
of space, a feminist
perspective is offered
by ElisabethElizabeth
Grosz in Space, Time
and Perversion. Essays
on the Politics of
Bodies. (New York:
Routledge, 1995).
On the concept
of “landscapes of
madness,” see Alberto
Montoya Hernández,
2006. Paisajes de
la locura. (México:
Paradigma, 2006).

26. The bond between
landscape and social
life has been brought
to the fore by the work
of social geographers,
of which Edward Soja’s
1989 book Postmodern
Geographies has been
a pioneering instance.
See also his more
recent Postmetropolis
(2000). These studies
do not specifically
focus on madness
and/as landscape, but
relating these two
fields would be a

worthwhile endeavour.
27. One funny but
revealing incident in
present-day social
reality demonstrates
what a “landscape
of madness” can
be. When filming an
incident of the Fools
chased away from the
public place, the
actors playing cleaners
who got rid of the
medieval Fools were
later approached
by resident visitors
of the Parisian flea
market, who thanked
them for getting rid
of “those crazies.” In
other words, the action
created a space where
madness threatened
to take over, and the
guys in uniforms were
automatically taken to
be the authorities, who
“saved” the market
from madness.
28. I am currently
devoting three books
to this question of the
political force of art.
One of these, Of What
One Cannot Speak
appeared in Spring 2011
from the University
of Chicago Press. On
realism, a philosophical
inquiry into its bond
with objectivism, see
Hilary Putnam, ‘The
Craving for Objectivity,’
New Literary History
15.2, (Winter) 1984: 229239, and ‘Objectivity
and the Science/Ethics
Distinction,’ in Realism
with a Human Face,
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University
Press, 1990).
29. That other
euphemism, “mentally
challenged,” again if
literally interpreted,
implies the possibility
to wilfully improve the
state of one’s mind. All
euphemisms based on
this word “challenged”
imply the worst
connotations of the
ideology of the

settings where, precisely, history can act up again, as it does in the lives of
the patients.27
But, in spite of the complicity of such settings, the film helps us think
precisely because it is not realistic in the traditional sense. It actively
avoids this rhetorical mode. We have several reasons for this avoidance
of straightforward realism. A realist reading will fail to do justice to the
inextricable bond between the film and the reality it critically engages—the
most important inter-ship. I am even inclined to generalize this point:
realism by definition distorts, obscures, and otherwise bypasses the bond
between art—or literary works—and reality. That bond, complex and
questionable as it is, remains a primary requirement for art to matter
socially.28
In the same vein, we maintain the term “Mad” for the characters that
hover in a state of patienthood. The clearest synonym of this word is
“mentally ill,” rather than the American euphemism “mentally disabled,” or
worse, “challenged.” Whereas “ill” is a cultural diagnosis of a state that does
not preclude competent agency, “disabled” is precisely the opposite of what
the characters turn out to be, and suggests permanence; as the film shows,
the mad are rather hyper-abled.29
Rather than avoiding the language, society is in need of different views
of a phenomenon that has a history. For this revision of the views the old
term may be more useful, reminding us as it does of the dangers inherent
in the views they express, not in the terms per se. Thus, such euphemisms
do the opposite of performing retrospection; they erase what needs to be
re-visioned. The authentication of psychosis compels a commitment to such
a strongly historical yet reversed, or “preposterous,” politics of time.30
The impossibility of realism—its fundamental unrealness—is most
clearly demonstrated by the “actual” psychoanalytic treatments we staged.
As mentioned, in the course of the film there are two supposedly completed
treatments of patients: a shorter one of a man called Herlat, taking place
in Françoise’s office, at the beginning and toward the end of the film;
and a longer treatment of Sissi, taking place throughout two-thirds of
the film in Pitkäniemi Hospital. These two sequences insist upon the
cinematic problem of realism. If played out earnestly, they would have to be
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documentary in style, with the voyeurism that comes with it, and boring in
length. If tampered with, as we were compelled to do, they might become
demeaning to the seriousness of the pain of the (fictionalized) afflicted
patients, thereby conforming to the usual caricature.
Schizophrenic Sissi, while coming from a very simple working-class
family, imagines herself to be (a double of) the Empress of Austria-Hungary.
This feature of the character became a great asset for visualization as well
as empowerment. Instead of or in addition to having her talk about her
imperial status and dignity, we dressed her in a variety of fancy clothes,
different for each session, with fitting hairstyles and jewellery. As it turned
out, and in no small measure thanks of the superb acting of Finnish actress
Marja Skaffari, the moving moments in the treatment when Sissi is evoking
extremely painful memories are set off against her exuberant dress with very
convincing, indeed contagious, poignancy. Thus we were able to create a
gripping image sequence, give Sissi her own voice, and stage her madness
without demeaning her through the symbolic violence of representation.
Founding Violence
In an ordinary social context, violence is done to many on an everyday basis.
Physical violence, the linguistic violence of hate speech, of the failure to
listen and to acknowledge, to serve as the “second person” without whom
subjectivity cannot mature, and the symbolic violence of representation:
all these forms of violence have the potential to drive their victims mad.
This potential constitutes another inter-ship, a porosity between “kinds” of
people, a porosity that makes society even more eager to draw firm, fearful
boundaries. What Mère Folle argues, demonstrates, and cinematically
“inflicts” on its viewers is precisely the breakdown of those boundaries. The
social relevance of madness lies in the uneasy but indispensable awareness
of the generative bond between violence and madness.
Sissi, the film slowly and half-heartedly reveals—half-heartedly because
her mental illness stands in the way of or shields her from full awareness—
has been made mad by sexual abuse and parental neglect. Herlat’s
condition is bound up with war in previous generations of his family. Aziz,
a Palestinian patient, has been driven to mad violence in response to
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American dream:
challenges can be met;
who fails is herself to
blame. Euphemisms,
well-meant as they
are, are misguided
attempts to take the
sting out of language.
They are misguided
because, precisely
through their erasure
of negativity in their
connotations, they
erase the persistence
of the socially current
views the older terms
express more honestly.
For a general study
of euphemisms, see
Keith Allan and Kate
Burridge, Euphemism
and Dysphemism:
Language Used as
Shield and Weapon,
(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991).
30. In addition to my
book mentioned above,
The Practice of Cultural
Analysis (1999), see
Cesare Casarino, ‘Time
Matters: Marx, Negri,
Agamben and the
Corporeal,’ Strategies:
Journal of the Theory,
Culture and Politics
16, no. 12, 2003:
185-206. Whilst mine
is primarily arttheoretical, Casarino’s
article is perhaps
best characterized as
Foucauldian-Marxist.

politically enforced impotence. At the end of the film, the aging Don Luis
explains to Françoise how close he came to madness in the concentration
camp of Mauthausen.
The insight I find most important to draw from all these connections
between violence and madness is what a cliché would phrase as “learning
from the past”: something “we” (here in the universal sense) never quite
manage. Psychoanalytic space is that space “in-between” where the past
can become a new start instead of something that crushes us. The dead
Ariste, who, in one moment, looks on at the scenes of madness played out
before him, is the embodiment of that deadly, but potentially regenerative
past. At another moment Sissi, as if emerging from the office door to which
she seemed glued like a painting, embodying the two-dimensionality the
hospital imposes on its patients, insists on the continued presence of the
past in a shot that captured her in-between state perfectly. This is her
opportunity to make a new start after having been stuck, to “get better,” as
she says several times.
This simple insight is key to the question of the relationship between
art and the political. It is not as if there is art, some of which happens to
be political. Political art is art because it is political; it is art by virtue of its
political “nature.” Neither art nor the political are defined by subject matter.
They are domains of agency, where acting becomes possible and can have
effects. In the case of political art, that agency is one and the same: it “works”
as art because it works politically. My reflections have been devoted to the
inseparability of those two elements, which nevertheless remain irreducible
to one another. Political art shows that they can neither be equated nor
severed. Instead, they deeply impact each other. Exploring what makes art
political, I seek to explore where art’s political efficacy can be located: how it
performs, how it exerts agency, and what the point is of art’s political agency
for the larger domain of society. Art is itself an inter-ship.
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